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Abstract
Machine Learning (ML) is an important component of computer science and a mainstream way
of making sense of large amounts of data. Although the technology is establishing new
possibilities in different fields, there are also problems to consider, one of which is bias. Due to
the inductive reasoning of ML algorithms in creating mathematical models, the predictions and
trends found by the models will never necessarily be true – just more or less probable. Knowing
this, it is unreasonable for us to expect the applied deductive reasoning of these models to ever
be fully unbiased. Therefore, it is important that we set expectations for ML that account for the
limitations of reality.
The current conversation of ML regards how and when to implement the technology to mitigate
the effect of bias on its results. This thesis suggests that the question of “whether” should be
addressed first. We tackle the issue of bias from the standpoint of justice and fairness in ML,
developing a framework tasked with determining whether the implementation of a specific ML
model is warranted. We accomplish this by emphasizing the liberal values that drive our
definitions of societal fairness and justice, such as the separateness of persons, moral evaluation,
freedom and understanding of choice, and accountability for wrongdoings.1

An immense “thank you” to Dr. Noreen Herzfeld for her limitless encouragement and mentorship throughout the
development of this work.
1
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1 Introduction
In the past few decades, humans have made technological progress on an exponential scale.
Moore’s law, although unable to precisely predict future advancements, emphasizes the
remarkable improvements we have made in the field of computer science. We have witnessed
exponential growth in both computational power and clock speeds, which inevitably are
expanding the possibilities within the field.2
As we are broadening the capabilities of computers and specifically artificial intelligence (AI),
we are exploring new applications. Some of these aid us in addressing the shortcomings of
humans, increasing both time- and task efficiency. An example is the concept of self-driving
cars. In 2018, the number of traffic deaths exceeded 40,000 for the third consecutive year; about
110 deaths daily. In 92 (±2) percent of cases, the accident could be attributed to human error.
This means that AI, although it would add a small computing error, has the potential to save
many lives by removing all or most of the unreliable human factor in car accidents.3 Our
respective economies will have to adapt to changes posed by these new developments.
Nevertheless, there is definite potential to help human beings lead better lives.
However, these advancements do not come without repercussions. In the endeavor of continuing
our technological explorations and addressing more complex issues, we are facing new
challenges in different aspects of development and application. One of these challenges is bias in
artificial intelligence (AI) and automation, whose foundation is machine learning. These biases
are not mere theoretical obstacles but have grave practical consequences for many undeserving
individuals (which will become evident as we proceed). For the purpose of this work, we intend
to explore the shortcomings of the machine learning models that lead to these biases, and how
we could address them by being more conscientious about how, but especially when we
implement the technology.
In this endeavor, we have tasked ourselves with developing a framework that will consider the
current impact of bias in machine learning and its relevance to societal injustices, to give
recommendations on whether implementation of a given machine learning model is warranted in
the given context. In the following sections, we will explore fundamental themes that such a
framework should include and use a bottom-up approach to establish its components
accordingly.

Roser, Max, and Hannah Ritchie. “Technological Progress.” Our World in Data, 2020.
https://ourworldindata.org/technological-progress.
3
“Traffic Safety Facts: A Brief Statistical Summary.” U.S Department of Transportation, 2015.
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115
2
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2 Background
2.1 Machine Learning
Machine learning (ML) is the ability for computers, through analysis of extensive datasets, to
find trends and make predictions using statistical models. It is the foundation of how many AI
applications learn, find patterns in data and predict outcomes based on previous subjects. The
figure below outlines only a subset of all available ML techniques.

Figure 1: A subset of available ML techniques.

4

2.1.1 Supervised Learning
There are distinctions to be made between different types of ML. The main type of learning we
will consider is supervised learning, which makes use of pre-defined labels to classify and find
patterns in data. In other words, unlike unsupervised learning, there are right and wrong answers
for the model to consider for each subject fed to it. An example of supervised learning is feeding
an algorithm a dataset filled with photos containing certain objects, along with the categories
they belong to. ML would attempt to categorize future subjects using what was seen in previous
examples. Not surprisingly, it is a complicated task that could go wrong. This was exactly the
case when, in 2015, Google received widespread criticism for Google Photos erroneously
labeling two Black individuals as gorillas.5 It is these types of discrimination and unfairness we
will continue discussing.
Ackermann, Nils. “Artificial Intelligence Framework: A Visual Introduction to Machine Learning and AI.”
Medium. Towards Data Science, December 15, 2018. https://towardsdatascience.com/artificial-intelligenceframework-a-visual-introduction-to-machine-learning-and-ai-d7e36b304f87.
5
Pachal, Pete. “Google Photos Identified Two Black People as 'Gorillas'.” Mashable. Mashable, July 1, 2015.
https://mashable.com/2015/07/01/google-photos-black-people-gorillas/?europe=true.
4
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Figure 2: Classification and regression – the two types of supervised learning tasks. 6

2.1.1.1 Tasks
The type of task performed in the above-mentioned example is called classification. It focuses on
categorizing subjects into different classes based on how different they are from other classes.
The other type of task is regression, which looks at similarities in the data that could help predict
a certain numerical value. Predicting how likely prisoners are to recidivate by assigning risk
scores to them is an example of a regression task. Worth noting is that regression tasks could be
considered a type of classification, in that a numerical threshold could be assigned to decide on
which category a certain numerical value belongs to (in the recidivism example these categories
could regard the approval or denial of bail or parole). In other words, classification is discrete
(categorical), whereas regression is continuous.7

6

A Visual Introduction to Machine Learning.
Brownlee, Jason. “Difference Between Classification and Regression in Machine Learning.” Machine Learning
Mastery, May 21, 2019. https://machinelearningmastery.com/classification-versus-regression-in-machine-learning/.
7
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Figure 3: The process of ML.8

2.1.1.2 Methods and Black-Box Models
As seen in Figure 1, we use numerous approaches to complete classification and regression
tasks.9 Oftentimes, these tasks become complex to the extent that the models by which they are
solved become hard to make sense of without additional tools. These models are referred to as
black-box models due to their high complexity. We will specifically address these models later.10
There are chiefly two types of complexity that contribute to black-box models – dimensionality
and the type of ML technique.
2.1.1.2.1 Dimensionality
Dimensionality is the number of attributes (or factors) that are considered by a ML algorithm.
For complex problems, such as predicting types of cancer in human beings based on gene
expression, it is not uncommon to consider datasets with more than 1,000 different genes, with
each of them being considered an independent attribute.11
In ML, it is commonly known that as the number of attributes considered increases, so does the
difficulty of analyzing the data in question. This is often referred to as the curse of
dimensionality due to the resulting complications, most of which regard the difficulty of
assessing how the model in question arrives at a certain decision, but also the increased
8

Visual Introduction to Machine Learning.
See 2.1.
10
See 4.4.3.
11
Molla, Michael, Michael Waddell, David Page, and Jude Shavlik. “Using Machine Learning to Design and
Interpret Gene-Expression Microarrays.” AI Magazine on Bioinformatics, 2004.
9
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likelihood of the model reflecting the specifics of its training dataset and not performing as well
on other datasets made for the task in question.12
2.1.1.2.2 Technique Type
Some ML techniques are obviously better for certain tasks and some techniques are more
complex and ambiguous than others. Neural networks, for instance – the technique by which
deep learning (a subset of ML) is deployed – are heavily used to display complex behavior in
computers, as seen in AI.13 They attempt to model the way our brains arrive at conclusions,
which is a complicated and diverse process due to how little we know about the brain.14
These techniques are usually called explainable models, as they are not intuitive in the same way
as other models and require measures (such as writing a summary program) to explain them. 15
Not all explainable models are supervised learning, although some are and will be covered in
detail as we discuss the impact of black-box models on bias. 16
2.2 Biases
Figure 3 describes the process of properly deploying ML. There is bias to consider in all
mentioned steps, but they can be classified as two distinct types: dataset bias and algorithmic
bias.
2.2.1 Dataset Bias
Everything a ML algorithm learns is based on input data, which means that if our data are
flawed, we will never receive an acceptable output.17 Each ML model must first be given a
training dataset, which is used to help the model understand the relationships between all
attributes in the data and the classifications given to each subject. If the dataset has biases, so
will the model.
A commonly discussed application of ML, which has received much criticism for its uneven
performance, is classifying gender in human beings. Gender Shades is a project, conducted by
MIT Media Lab, which explores gender- and racial bias in well-known facial recognition
algorithms. The project specifically chose to consider facial recognition software made by three
companies: IBM, Microsoft and Megvii.
At first glance, the algorithms display high overall gender classification accuracies (between
94% and 87% for all three). However, when we consider the misclassified cases, biases become
12

Tan, Pang-Ning, Anuj Karpatne, Vipin Kumar, and Michael Steinbach. Introduction to Data Mining. Harlow:
Pearson, 2020.
13
Ibid.
14
“5 Unsolved Mysteries about the Brain.” Allen Institute for Brain Science, March 14, 2019.
https://alleninstitute.org/what-we-do/brain-science/news-press/articles/5-unsolved-mysteries-about-brain.
15
Molnar, Christopher. Interpretable Machine Learning: A Guide for Making Black Box Models Explainable.
GitHub, 2020.
16
Mols, Bennie. “In Black Box Algorithms We Trust (or Do We?).” ACM, March 16, 2017.
https://cacm.acm.org/news/214618-in-black-box-algorithms-we-trust-or-do-we/fulltext.
17
Sharma, Dhruv. “Problems in Machine Learning Models? Check Your Data First.” Medium. Towards Data
Science, August 31, 2019. https://towardsdatascience.com/problems-in-machine-learning-models-check-your-datafirst-f6c2c88c5ec2.
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evident. With Microsoft’s software, 93.6% of times faces were mistaken, the subject was Black.
With Megvii’s Face++ software, 95.9% of misclassifications were made when the subject was a
woman. And, with IBM’s software, the misclassification rate of darker women was 34.4% higher
than that of lighter men.18 These are not small margins.
A large reason for the bias seen in these models is the lack of proper subject distribution in
common training datasets.19 Minorities and women are usually less represented, which leads to
ML algorithms overemphasizing White men. Joy Buolamwini, the founder of the Algorithmic
Justice League and leader of the Gender Shades research team, noticed that in the IJB-A, a
dataset commonly used in facial recognition by governmental bodies, 75.4% of all subjects were
male, and at least 79% of the subjects had lighter skin.20 ML algorithms learn what they see,
which makes it no surprise that facial recognition currently performs best on light-skinned men.
To address the issue of dataset bias, we must consider what an optimized dataset looks like.
There are general guidelines on how to develop those, which we will not fully outline. The gist is
that the distribution of subjects by pre-defined group membership should be equal (or close to it)
for all involved groups, to make sure that the ML model in question does not overemphasize
certain portions and features of a dataset, as seen in our previous example. 21 22
2.2.2 Algorithmic Bias
Part of the ML process is choosing and designing a learning algorithm that takes input datasets
and learns based on their contents.23 Algorithmic bias is the bias that arises from discrimination
in the learning algorithm and, eventually the resulting ML model. Algorithmic bias is a broader,
more general term than dataset bias, in that other factors than the learning algorithm (including
dataset bias itself) have a direct impact on algorithmic bias.24 Regardless of how solid an
algorithm is, it can only be as good as the dataset fed to it, and the choices made in defining it.
These choices may entail deciding on which algorithm is best suited to complete the task in
question, the weights assigned to the learning algorithm, the structure of the algorithm itself, or
anything closely related. All of it has an impact on algorithmic bias.25

Buolamwini, Joy. “Gender Shades.” Gender Shades, 2018. http://gendershades.org/overview.html.
Buolamwini, Joy A. “Gender Shades: Intersectional Phenotypic and Demographic Evaluation of Face Datasets
and Gender Classifiers.” MIT Media Lab, 2017, 2017.
20
Buolamwini, Joy. “Artificial Intelligence Has a Racial and Gender Bias Problem.” Time. Time, February 7, 2019.
https://time.com/5520558/artificial-intelligence-racial-gender-bias/.
21
Torralba, Antonio, and Alexei A. Efros. “Unbiased Look at Dataset Bias.” Cvpr 2011, 2011.
https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2011.5995347.
22
Deeper Look at Dataset Bias (PDF)
23
“Machine Learning Crash Course | Google Developers.” Google. Google. Accessed March 29, 2020.
https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/.
24
Mehrabi, Ninareh, Fred Morstatter, Nripsuta Saxena, Aram Galstyan, and Kristina Lerman. “A Survey on Bias
and Fairness in Machine Learning.” USC, Information Sciences Institute, September 17, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3341161.3342915.
25
Hao, Karen. “This Is How AI Bias Really Happens-and Why It's so Hard to Fix.” MIT Technology Review. MIT
Technology Review, February 4, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612876/this-is-how-ai-bias-reallyhappensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/.
18
19

12

2.2.3 Hardware Bias
Not all bias is software- or data-related. For instance, in the case of Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) positioning (the most famous example of which is GPS), there are small
deviations when reading phase changes that emerge from bias in hardware (specifically the
satellite and receiver).26 For this thesis, we will disregard hardware bias.
2.3 Cognitive Source of Dataset and Algorithmic Bias
Many of the problems regarding both dataset and algorithmic bias would be thoroughly
mitigated with some theoretically basic solutions, and extensive research is being made on the
details of these issues. A year after doing their first audit, the Gender Shades research team did a
second audit on the same three companies and found that they all had significantly improved the
performance of their models. Microsoft, for instance, which had a 20.8% difference in
performance between darker females and lighter males, brought that same number down to 1.5%
a year later. Face++ and IBM also made significant improvements, although the most
disadvantaged in the context were still female subjects and those with darker skin. In terms of
bias directly related to algorithms, improvements are also being made. Recent research has found
a way to mitigate bias in the algorithms themselves, even with poor datasets. This is done by
means of latent structure analysis, which allows for the importance of some attributes in training
datasets to be redistributed and for bias to be reduced as a result.27
Nevertheless, as we witness improvements, some of the major problems remain. In the second
audit, Gender Shades also investigated two newer facial recognition models, made by Kairos and
Amazon respectively. Amazon clearly had the worst performance of all audited models, with a
31.4% performance difference between darker females and lighter males; almost as
underwhelming as IBM in 2018.28
Despite the evident biases, Amazon found it convenient to pitch their software to the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for use in their operations. This is software that
would more than likely misidentify people of color frequently, leading to unjust arrests. Either
Amazon was unaware of these biases (which would imply serious negligence), or the company
simply does not care. Our current societies and economies incentivize the release of unethical
products due to their profitability, with entities rarely being held accountable. There are

Håkansson, Martin. “Hardware biases and their impact on GNSS positioning.”, 2017.
See also: “What Is GNSS?” European Global Navigation Satellite Systems Agency, August 29, 2017.
https://www.gsa.europa.eu/european-gnss/what-gnss.
27
Amini, Alexander, Ava P. Soleimany, Wilko Schwarting, Sangeeta N. Bhatia, and Daniela Rus. “Uncovering and
Mitigating Algorithmic Bias through Learned Latent Structure.” Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on
AI, Ethics, and Society, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3306618.3314243.
28
Hao, Karen. “Making Face Recognition Less Biased Doesn't Make It Less Scary.” MIT Technology Review. MIT
Technology Review, February 15, 2019. https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612846/making-face-recognitionless-biased-doesnt-make-it-less-scary/.
26
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numerous examples, with Cathy O’Neil, Virginia Eubanks and others having written books
containing many of them (some of which will be covered briefly in this work).29 30
This brings us to the fundamental problem of bias in supervised ML: cognitive biases.31Although
dataset and algorithmic biases are concerns, they directly derive from our implicit biases. These
become apparent in how much we expect from the ML model. How much can it discriminate and
still be acceptable (or fair)? How lenient can we be in our requirements on data collection? How
much empirical research do we need before including a feature in our dataset? How confident are
we that the chosen learning algorithm is the best suited one? Do we understand the algorithm
well enough to know how it arrives at decisions? And lastly, the question that we hope to
answer: For which contexts and with which solutions is ML warranted at all? These are only
some of the questions that should be answered every time ML is deployed and, oftentimes, we
fail to answer all of them correctly (we will find that sometimes there is no “correct” answer),
which leads to severe consequences.
No matter how hard we try to erase these biases, they will remain present. Usually, we do not
recognize our implicit biases and their significant impacts on outcome. A prime example came
up in Amazon’s attempt to make a program that would aid in recruiting. It was quickly detected
that the program was biased against women, which was assumed to be due to women being
directly used as an assessment variable, or feature, in the program. However, when group
membership became an excluded feature, the program was still discriminating against women.
After extensive investigation it was discovered that the program was, unbeknownst to the
developers, seeing a pattern in resume word usage among men and women respectively, which
made the program favor men’s resumes. The training set used consisted of resumes from
successful Amazon employees, most of whom have been male in the past, which skewed the
results.32
Initially this seems like a farfetched bias and stereotype but it has empirical evidence behind it.33
Out of the many factors impacting a complex model, the first thought is rarely to assume that
word usage is the main contributing factor to bias. It is evident that when faced with multiple
factors (attributes) to consider (in some cases thousands), humans will be unable to account for
all of them. For this and other reasons, the thesis will largely be focusing on the human
limitations that come with ML. The limitations of our programs start and end with us. If our
Peterson, Andrea, and Jake Laperruque. “Amazon Pushes ICE to Buy Its Face Recognition Surveillance Tech.”
The Daily Beast. The Daily Beast Company, October 23, 2018. https://www.thedailybeast.com/amazon-pushes-iceto-buy-its-face-recognition-surveillance-tech.
30
Eubanks, Virginia. Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor. New
York: Picador, St. Martins Press, 2019.
31
Turner-Lee, Nicol, Paul Resnick, and Genie Barton. “Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices
and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms.” Brookings. Brookings, October 25, 2019.
https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-toreduce-consumer-harms/.
32
Dastin, Jeffrey. “Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias against Women.” Reuters.
Thomson Reuters, October 10, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automationinsight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G.
33
Jackson, Abby. “12 Words That Are More Familiar to Women than Men.” Business Insider. Business Insider,
March 24, 2017. https://www.businessinsider.com/gender-and-vocabulary-analysis-women-2017-3?r=US&IR=T.
29
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limitations and flaws are accounted for, doing the same for our ML models will become a
simpler task.
In assessing biases, we will mainly be assessing the output, except when discussing the
interpretability of an algorithm.34Long-term, it is the output of a certain model that defines
whether the dataset and algorithm were appropriately chosen and deployed. It is by considering
the output that we can properly assess whether the input data and/or ML technique must be
improved. This, of course, disregards how understandable the model is to the general public (and
prioritizes performance ahead of interpretability) but allows us to see how often the models in
question get things right, regardless of how they arrive at decisions.
2.4 Inductive and Deductive Reasoning
We have many ways of classifying the knowledge we receive from ML applications. However,
conclusions reached based on output from ML algorithms are oftentimes defined by either their
predictive or descriptive nature.
Predictive tasks have, as indicated by the name, the goal of predicting outcomes or
characteristics in future subjects, based on trends and data seen in previous subjects. In more
technical terms, these tasks assume dependence of certain attributes in datasets on other
independent attributes and try to make predictions based on the given relationships.35 A more
well-known application is using historic stock market trends to try to predict future outcomes.36
Descriptive tasks, on the other hand, try to highlight trends and patterns in data for various useful
purposes. Different statistical measures, such as clustering or association rule mining, consider
what attributes have in common and set them apart, and find appropriate ways to present relevant
conclusions.37
Although there is much to separate these types of tasks, they have one trait in common: the
construction of all models related to descriptive and predictive ML tasks are based on inductive
reasoning. Inductive, or bottom-up reasoning, is the concept of using statements and instances of
different sorts to provide evidence in support of a certain claim (as opposed to deductive
reasoning, where we make use of informational input to reach, by way of logical discourse and
while assuming the truth of the input, fully true conclusions).38 We then apply our inductively
reasoned models to deduce conclusions about future subjects, or to find patterns within data.
Both inductive and deductive reasoning have value, but the former can be misinterpreted,
whereas the latter cannot. Deductive reasoning, if done correctly, leads to what is called
necessarily true conclusions, which are true regardless of circumstance, so long as the logical
foundation of the issue in question (as well as the assumptions that accompany them) does not
34

See 4.4.
”Features” and ”attributes” will be used interchangeably in this work.
36
Kompella, Subhadra, and Kalyana Chakravarthy Chilukuri. “Stock Market Prediction Using Machine Learning
Methods.” International Journal Of Computer Engineering And Technology 10, no. 3 (2019).
https://doi.org/10.34218/ijcet.10.3.2019.003.
37
Introduction to Data Mining.
38
Bradford, Alina. “Deductive Reasoning vs. Inductive Reasoning.” LiveScience. Purch, July 25, 2017.
https://www.livescience.com/21569-deduction-vs-induction.html.
35
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change. Inductive reasoning, however, only provides evidence for or against a claim, without
making it necessarily true. The best inductive reasoning can do is to make certain claims more
(or less) probable.
2.4.1 The Problem of Induction
It is here that the problem of induction comes into play. English philosopher C.D Broad
famously stated that “induction is the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy.”39
Posed by many prominent philosophers (including David Hume), the main criticism of inductive
reasoning is that it can never provide epistemic certainty.40 There will always be parts of the
inductively reached conclusions that remain incomplete. For this reason, since the deductive
reasoning applied by ML models is based on inductive reasoning, there will be unaccommodated
gaps of knowledge in our conclusions.
The problem of induction targets descriptive and predictive ML tasks in different ways. For
descriptive tasks, it criticizes that generalization based on patterns seen in data never will provide
pure knowledge (since we can never assume full truth of the input, or data), even in cases where
all subjects point to the same classification (which would be considered the best-case scenario).
For predictive tasks, the criticism is directed toward the impossibility of accurately predicting all
future outcomes based on previous ones.
In ML, we rarely encounter best-case scenarios. If we have information that assertively suggests
a generalization or future outcome, we will likely not use ML to confirm it. We would, for
instance, not need ML to tell us that the probability of each outcome on a regular, fair-weighted
die is one-sixth. Although various shapes and designs will have slightly different outcomes
(engraved dots, for instance, may change the weight distribution of a die), we neglect these
attributes due to their lack of relevance in the larger scheme of things. Since trial and error has
given us no reason to think otherwise, we have, through inductive reasoning, concluded that in
the case of a six-sided die with (relatively) even weight distribution, the respective probabilities
will remain constant. ML is applied to cases in which the answers are not as obvious.
Due to this problem of induction, we cannot generalize and, with full certainty, make necessarily
correct assumptions about outcomes for future subjects, or the attributes by which they are
assessed. In more technical terms, the answers we get from ML are of a probabilistic, nondeterministic nature. It is thus unreasonable to expect perfection from our ML models and
applications. Imperfection is therefore not part of the problem for bias and should not be
perceived as such. It is the way imperfection is dealt with that becomes the main issue.
2.5 Justice and Fairness in ML
Theoretically, the problem of induction suggests that due to the inductive reasoning of ML
model development, we will find ourselves in situations where not everyone is treated equally by
the resulting models. This theoretical discrimination will, however, also have a practical impact
39

Broad, C. D. The Philosophy of Francis Bacon: an Address Delivered at Cambridge on the Occasion of the Bacon
Tercentenary, 5 October 1926. New York: Octagon Books, 1976.
40
Hume, David, and Tom L. Beauchamp. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: a Critical Edition.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009.
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on people’s lives, which we have seen in previous examples and seek to explore further. In light
of this issue, the interpretation of what is fair and just becomes relevant. Much of the general
discussion regarding justice is about how we establish equity, which warrants those same
discussions taking place in the context of ML. But, before we proceed, we must highlight the
distinction between justice and fairness.
These terms are often used interchangeably, although doing so has created confusion in the past,
as it makes the task of distinguishing between moral obligations, versus considerations, difficult.
Justice is the moral concept of what is right. Fairness, on the other hand, is the personal
evaluation of justice. As Goldman and Cropanzano state, ““Justice” denotes the conduct that is
morally required, whereas “fairness” denotes an evaluative judgment as to whether this conduct
is morally praiseworthy.” 41 In this sense, justice is a concept independent of fairness, in that it
can exist without satisfying fairness. This does not, however, necessarily mean that we have
access to this definition of justice, but even if we did, it would be difficult to attain due to our
biased evaluations. The question then becomes to what extent we can accommodate fairness,
while having solid considerations for ML justice. We will clarify the reason(s) for this specific
approach in the coming sections.42
2.6 Full Accommodation of Fairness in ML
In situations of complete consensus, we seem to be less concerned with investigating whether an
outcome is fair. In these instances, we assume that since every individual in question has the
same definition of fairness, that the outcome indeed must be fair. Unfortunately, this best-case
scenario is almost never a reality – especially when we have many people with different
backgrounds involved (which oftentimes applies to ML). The question then becomes: “In
situations of disagreement, is there a way for ML to accommodate everyone’s fairness
definitions?” One can argue that some fairness definitions are bad and that some are good, but
completing such assessments would require one to make assumptions beyond what we know to
be necessarily true. For that reason, taking an approach which does not intend to accommodate
all definitions of fairness is selective without justification.
Nonetheless, the answer to this question has its foundation in whether one finds fairness
subjective or objective. If we find that fairness is objective, we should only look to account for
what is objectively fair and just. However, by the definition used in 2.5, fairness is the personal
evaluation of justice, which is a subjective concept. This means, in turn, that any disagreement
on what fair course of action is would imply that fairness is not fully accommodated in that
instance (we believe most people encounter such situations frequently). This would consequently
apply to ML, as any approach to accommodate fairness (or any disagreement with such
approach) would only be a personal evaluation of what is considered just, and not necessarily
what is actually just. Therefore, regardless of situation and how close to perfect an application is,
there will be instances of unfairness due to us having different definitions of what is fair. In other
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words – no, we cannot accommodate everyone with one singular solution – with or without ML
models. This should, however, not stop us from trying to optimize our conditions.
When we discuss fairness, we often discuss equality. It may sound like a simple measure of
fairness, and sometimes, that may be true. But, what do we exactly mean by equality? Is it the
equality of goods? The equality of opportunity? The equality of treatment? Ronald Dworkin
explored this topic in his two essays, “The Equality of Welfare” and “The Equality of
Resources”. He discovered that equality oftentimes is not what we are looking for. Equality, just
for the sake of it, is counterproductive and unethical.43 Assuming limited resources, what point is
there in providing insulin for someone who does not have diabetes?
Although it is much more difficult to define, as it requires us to consider the diversity of
perspective and needs, the concept of equity has taken precedence over equality. For our
purposes, we will define equity as “giving everyone what they need to be successful” moving
forward. 44
Sometimes, equity and some type of equality mean the same thing. Sometimes, giving everyone
what they need to be successful implies treating everyone the same, or giving everyone the same
opportunity. When we discuss access to human rights, this is often the case. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, states that “the inherent dignity and […] the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world.”45 However, for situations in which equality is not equity, there are
disagreements on what decisions would be considered fair, which most certainly becomes
relevant in the application of ML. All these concerns will help set the foundation for justice in
our framework of ML implementation considerations.
2.7 Problem Statement
In the previous sections, we have discussed the presence of bias, the nature of it, and the reasons
as to why it inevitably impacts fairness and justice in our societies. In our attempts to address
these problems, we often ask how and when we can ethically use ML. However, we rarely ask
whether it is ethically justified to implement ML models to complete tasks in certain contexts.
The questions of “how” and “when” to ethically use a certain application of ML are dependent
on the existence of an affirmative answer to the question of “whether”.
Some tasks cannot be ethically completed in certain contexts, which will become evident in
some of the examples mentioned below.46 Another problem is that we oftentimes focus on the
performance of a task, rather than the context in which a task is being performed. We tend to
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assume that the implementation is wrong and that it could be remedied. This is not always the
case.
To address these issues, we have tasked ourselves with developing a framework that will
consider the current problems of fairness and justice in ML, along with the evident technological
and cognitive bias limitations, to give recommendations on whether implementation of ML is
warranted in a given context, with a given ML model. In doing so, the framework also intends to
set expectation standards for ML, both pre- and post-implementation. We hope that this will
encourage more self-awareness in programmers and users of ML technology about the impact of
their actions, but also optimism about the potential for societal and technological improvement.
The framework in question will be assuming liberalism as deployed in most Western countries as
the pursued virtue. This means that values such as freedom of choice, separateness of persons
and theoretical impartiality will be commonly encountered themes. This is a reasonable approach
for a general framework, as the theoretical ambition should not be set any lower than full
accommodation for all individuals. Now, with a set foundation of background knowledge, we
consider the current situation before commencing the development of the framework.
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3 Current State of the Field
3.1 Fairness Verification
As the problem of fairness in ML has been increasingly highlighted publicly, measures have
been taken to actively assess how well applications account for fairness. At the University of
Wisconsin – Madison, a team of researchers have worked on a bias verification program called
FairSquare, which is a mathematical approach to assessing bias presence. The gist of the practice
is to assume a certain fairness criterion, defined by mathematical constraints, and check to see
whether a program is successfully fulfilling that criterion.47Assuming that the fairness criteria are
“correct”, this is a truly helpful practice to ensure less biased software use. Nevertheless, there
are many situations in which we are not certain about the “right” definition of fairness; likely
because our definitions almost never are fully fair, and much less so when we attempt to model
them mathematically (which is the case with ML). In the coming paragraphs, we will outline the
problems with our current definitions of fairness from most to least critical.
3.2 Non-Empirical Feedback Loops
A common problem in ML regards the features by which a ML model attempts to complete a
task or answer a question. It is common for governmental entities to occasionally include
attributes in their datasets that have no empirically shown correlation with the attempted
classification. The TSA has, for instance, received criticism for discriminating against Muslim
subjects by using biased attributes.48 49
In the worst scenarios, we take those wrongfully included features and draw erroneous
conclusions about what their contribution to a certain result should tell us. We accept results
without confirming their proper function. In Washington, D.C during the 2008 recession, for
instance, the city administration started assessing teacher performance using a ML program
called IMPACT. This program was to make decisions on which teachers to hold responsible (and
release) for poor learning results among students in the district. The program was responsible for
50 percent of the assessment for each subject. Although the program’s features were not revealed
to the public, the results surprised many, as some of the top-rated teachers in the district (as
judged by administrators and parents) received the lowest performance scores overall and were
fired as a result. It became evident that one of the higher weighted features of IMPACT was
changes in standardized test scores for students, from year to year. USA Today later also
discovered that there was a significant level of erasures on the standardized tests assessed at
many of the schools in the district (almost a fourth of them, specifically). This implied cheating
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by students, and possibly teachers allowing them to check their own answers. In the
investigations, teachers were not asked if they contributed to this high level of erasure
(specifically wrong-to-right answers). 50 And, the teachers who were fired never received
explanations as to how IMPACT arrived at their low scores.
IMPACT assumed that better grades implies more learning, which there is no general empirical
evidence for (it may apply in certain schools, but not all). This is what O’Neil refers to as a
“WMD [Weapon of Math Destruction] feedback loop”, which accepts a ML model arriving at
the right answer without having empirical backing. O’Neil discusses a more general example:
Employers, for example, are increasingly using credit scores to evaluate potential hires.
Those who pay their bills promptly, the thinking goes, are more likely to show up to work
on time and follow the rules. In fact, there are plenty of responsible people and good
workers who suffer misfortune and see their credit scores fall. But the belief that bad
credit correlates with bad job performance leaves those with low scores less likely to find
work. Joblessness pushes them toward poverty, which further worsens their scores,
making it even harder for them to land a job. It’s a downward spiral. And employers
never learn how many good employees they’ve missed out on by focusing on credit
scores.51

Usually, we assess the success of a classification task by considering misclassification rates.
These answer the question: “A posteriori, how often did the model get things right?” In the
examples seen above, this question cannot be answered as there is no misclassification rate to
consider. We do not know how many times we got things wrong, which acts as positive
reinforcement for the developers and users; all they know is that it gets some job done.
3.3 Current Fairness Criteria
There are three approaches currently used with intention to maximize fairness in our ML models.
These are anti-classification, classification parity and calibration. Corbett-Davies and Goel
(2018) did a comprehensive analysis of the potential flaws that each approach may have.52 We
will analyze the effectiveness of these using the example of a program called COMPAS,
developed in 2016, which assigns inmates recidivism risk scores for sentencing by considering
more than 100 different factors that supposedly play a role in an inmate’s probability of
reoffending. Its outcomes were passionately discussed after its implementation, which has made
for increased statistical availability.
3.3.1 Anti-Classification
Anti-classification disregards which pre-defined group (such as ethnicity or sex) one belongs to,
with the intention of not having that impact the result of the model. In other words, pre-defined
group membership is not considered a feature of the developed ML model. However, although
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this approach has good intentions, anti-classification could have an adverse effect if
classifications are disregarded.
For instance, results show that it is inevitable that COMPAS will discriminate against women if
anti-classification is enforced. Without considering the classification of the subjects in question,
women are assigned significantly higher risk scores for the same subject recidivism rates. In
other words, this implies that women who do not recommit crimes are given harder treatment by
the ML model (and – in turn – the courts) if the assessment does not directly consider the
subject’s gender. This is due to implicit biases of our data inevitably leading to our learning
algorithms catching patterns indirectly related to group membership, changing the treatment of
certain subjects accordingly.
Usually, we do not recognize our implicit biases and their significant impacts on outcome. This
is the danger with anti-classification. The aforementioned Amazon recruitment system is enough
evidence that anti-classification does not mean anti-discrimination.53
3.3.2 Classification Parity
Classification parity is the approach that intentionally regards group membership and ensures
that the evaluation measure for each subject’s performance is equalized across the relevant
groups. This uses confusion matrices – a concept commonly used in ML to determine how often
a model classifies correctly – for each pre-defined group classification to assess how well the
ML model in question works (usually by considering metrics such as precision and false positive
rates) and to equalize in accordance.
The problem with classification parity is that our measures of risk distribution will be different
for every relevant group classification. In that regard, if we make decisions on relevance based
on a single threshold for all groups, we are not exercising classification parity (as there will be
disparity in how each group is treated, based on their respective risk distribution). The solution is
to assign a different threshold for each group that accounts for the relative risk distributions of
each classification. When this approach is taken, however, we see large differences in optimal
thresholds for different demographics, meaning that classification parity also could result in
some demographics being significantly more roughly treated than others. For COMPAS,
regardless of whether one wanted to minimize recidivism or achieve most equal treatment across
all relevant groups, this resulted in a 16-17% optimal threshold for Black subjects (meaning that
less than a fifth of Black subjects would have high enough risk scores to be detained), compared
to 31% for White subjects – a significant difference (which will be discussed briefly later).54
With classification parity, it is also difficult to know whether the problem is actual
discrimination or underlying problems that lead to the impression of discrimination. In some
situations, the possibility exists that the risk distribution that results for a certain group is close to
true, but that vast disparities give us reason to believe that the distribution is biased.
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Classification parity disregards this possibility by reasoning that bias must always be accounted
for by equating subjects by group membership, when this is not always the case.
3.3.3 Calibration
Calibration is a tool used to ensure that the predictions of a certain model align well with actual
outcomes (and that if they do not, that the model gets “calibrated” accordingly). In other words,
it sets a standard for what the risk score in question is supposed to mean across all subjects.
Thus, calibration implies that the same predicted classifications for two different groups should
mean the same (or very similar) thing in real life and modifies the model until that is the case.
Calibration for COMPAS, for instance, would mean that the same risk score for two subjects of
different groups would imply the same recidivism rates for those respective groups.
One problem with calibration is its susceptibility to direct discrimination.55 Redlining (that is, the
systematic approach taken by governmental entities to limit resources for minority communities),
for instance, has been heavily associated with calibration, in that it allows the modification of
each subject’s risk score to gather around a distribution that is less beneficial for a certain
group.56 The flexibility provided by calibration also oftentimes implies that standards are a nonnecessity in the context, which defeats the point of one of our current objectives – to set a
standard for what fairness looks like in ML.
3.4 Mutual Exclusivity of Fairness Criteria
As pointed out, all currently used mathematical definitions of fairness have their respective
biases. One may then wonder about the possibilities of combining the strengths of all three
measures to account for all their flaws. It turns out that this is oftentimes impossible.
There are instances in which two or more different criteria, which all cover legitimate concerns
and most likely should contribute to the scenario’s holistic definition of fairness, contradict one
another mathematically. The reason COMPAS became a topic of discussion was because of the
disagreements in what was considered fair.
Race was not one of the features, meaning that the program developer, Northpointe, was
exercising anti-classification with COMPAS. On the one hand, Northpointe correctly argued that
COMPAS was accurate in its assessment ( “defendants assigned the highest risk score
reoffended at almost four times the rate as those assigned the lowest score”), and that the
program achieved this without considering race. On the other hand, news organization
ProPublica accurately claimed that the program treated Black people who did not recommit
crimes rougher than White people in the same category (on average, Black people in this
category were given a risk score twice as high).57
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We could argue that both Northpointe and ProPublica’s perspectives should be part of the
holistic fairness definition and be included in the program’s assessment. Race should, by our
moral measures, likely not be an attribute of the program, and Black people who do not reoffend
should not be considered higher risk than White people in the same category. However, based on
a mathematical analysis of the program, COMPAS would be unable to achieve the constraints set
out by both companies. Fulfilling one fairness criterion would require us to exclude the other
fairness criterion, making it mathematically impossible to achieve mutual inclusivity of all
fairness criteria in the case of COMPAS. It becomes evident that if this is a reality for one ML
model, that it is a possibility for others as well. This example points out the shortcomings of
mathematical models in achieving what we would consider fully fair outcomes.
3.5 Theoretical Versus Empirical Observations
Theoretically, the problem of induction already implied that ML would not be able to achieve
full accommodation of fairness.58 Now, we have seen empirical evidence in support of that
claim. No matter how hard we try, perfection will never exist in ML, and for that reason, it
should never be the expectation. Our task is to develop a framework that accounts for both
theoretical and practical limitations and sets a standard for the expectations that should be placed
on ML models and tasks we hope to solve.
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4 Development of Framework
We have now established the difficulties of fully accommodating fairness, and thus establishing
equity. Thus, it is of importance to emphasize solutions that aim to maximize the parts of fairness
we define (or should define) similarly (we will elaborate on this in 4.1).
For proper application of the framework, three input objects must be defined:
1. The task to be solved
2. The ML model by which the task is to be completed
3. The implementation context of the task
The considerations of the framework will not be discussed in the order that they are addressed in
the framework itself; that order is established for our convenience in our condensed flowchart
representation.59 As seen in above-mentioned examples, the definition of optimal distribution
(for establishing equity) is the main question that remains unanswered in supervised ML tasks.
We will begin by addressing that question, and see if our answer resembles any of the previously
outlined criteria of fairness currently used in ML.
4.1 Distributive Justice
The question of optimal distribution raises the concept of distributive justice, which is the branch
of justice that concerns itself with the just distribution of goods – both tangible
(products/materials) and non-tangible (services).
The problem in ML is often the distribution of mistakes. For reasons that require no explanation,
the discrimination against women and dark skin as seen in Gender Shades is a prime example of
distributive injustice in ML.60 The question then becomes: “What would constitute distributive
justice in this and any other supervised learning context?” John Rawls can help us set a
foundation.
4.1.1 John Rawls’ Justice as Fairness
Since fairness looks different to every individual, based on their respective nature and nurture,
we want to consider philosophical theories that account for the separateness and biases of
individuals, and allow us to set an objective standard for distributive justice. We also want to
explore the extent to which we can find consensus despite the biases we have regarding fairness.
Rawls recognized the presence of human bias and thought of ways to theoretically mitigate its
effects on our definitions of justice.
In A Theory of Justice (1972), John Rawls introduces theories on what distributive justice should
look like to a reasonable human being. In other words, Rawls describes the foundation of
distributive justice, by outlining what everyone, regardless of personal preferences and
definitions of fairness, can (or should) agree on. The conclusions he reaches are independent of

59
60

See 4.6.
See 2.2.1

25

virtue, or the common good – they are focused on justice. He calls the theory “Justice as
Fairness.”61
In his work, Rawls famously describes the concept of the original position; a thought experiment
that assumes what is called a veil of ignorance. A veil of ignorance is the concept of removing
the partial human characteristics of the individuals/parties in question, thus rendering decision
making as impartial as possible. Rawls makes the case that this theoretical impartiality will aid in
establishing the foundation of justice, since one would make decisions knowing nothing about
oneself or other individuals. In summary, the original position is the one all people would
(theoretically) take, had they not known anything about themselves or others, and should
therefore be used as the foundation of distributive justice.
In exploring this position of supposed complete impartiality, Rawls comes up with two basic
principles of justice that he considers applicable, regardless of one’s biased stance on fairness. In
his 1985 book Political Liberalism, where he refines some of the arguments made in A Theory of
Justice, he describes these as follows:
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties,
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political
liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value [liberty principle].
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to
positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity [fair equality of
opportunity principle]; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
members of society [difference principle].

Rawls makes a strong case for all, claiming that from the original position, these are conditions
all reasonable individuals would want for themselves and others. He also notes that a) takes
precedence over b), should these two interfere.62
Rawls claims that all reasonable individuals, regardless of their backgrounds and outlooks on the
common good, would be inclined to agree with the abovementioned principles, due to what he
calls overlapping consensus. He defines a reasonable individual as someone who is willing to
work with other individuals in their respective societies to reach mutual agreements that fairly
accommodate all.63
His ideas of overlapping consensus are derived from Immanuel Kant’s concept of the categorical
imperative, which claims that reason within each individual allows us, by logical discourse, to
arrive at some principles of morality that are applicable to all, regardless of one’s views in regard
to everything else.64 Rawls makes the case that his outlined argument in “Justice as Fairness” is
as far as we can go in establishing the categorical imperative from a societal standpoint.65
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In establishing the difference principle, Rawls recognizes the distinction between equality and
equity, and that not all individuals from the beginning of time recognize unconditional equality
as the best definition of fairness. This is also part of Rawls’ Pareto argument for inequality,
which makes the claim that inequality is virtue if it benefits everyone in the context.66 He points
out that sometimes, regardless of how conscientious we are in accommodating fairness, we will
have inequalities. In those cases, he claims that such inequalities should favor “the least
advantaged.”67
Rawls’ theories were mainly intended for optimizing societal structures to accommodate
endeavors of all individuals. Nevertheless, the goods produced by our societies that directly
affect individuals should also reflect the values by which these societal structures are established.
In other words, if we have goods produced by the market that limit enforcements of the “basic
structures of society”, that is a problem. For that reason, the same societal structures developed
by Rawls are also applicable to ML and its respective operations.
4.1.1.1 Choice of Fairness Criteria
From this, one could assume that Rawls likely would prefer the approach of classification parity
to the other two, as the inequality in question will often favor what we consider to be the least
advantaged group (with COMPAS for instance, we could strongly argue that Black people are
less advantaged in Western societies than White people).68 The important question to answer,
regardless of situation, is if the solution in question favors what we consider to be the least
advantaged in the context of the issue.
One major weakness of Rawls’ discourse: he never confidently defines the least advantaged.
This is especially a weakness since we would need to properly identify the least advantaged for
classification parity to fulfill the requirements of Rawls’ justice principles. He does describe the
potential traits of a relatively disadvantaged person (most of which focused on social and
economic class differences) but does not go onto introducing a formal definition. In a later paper,
he changes his description of the least advantaged individuals, and characterizes them by how
undeserving people are of the position they are in. His description begs the question: “Is this
individual better or worse off, based on the initial conditions that they were given?”69 There are
weaknesses in both descriptions, but moving forward, we will assume that the definition of “the
least advantaged” is sufficiently accounted for and that the hypothetical context of the ML model
implementation makes it possible to accurately define the least advantaged group of individuals.
One can also argue the extent to which inequality between groups can be considered acceptable,
even in the case of favoring the least advantaged (and thus abiding by Rawls’ difference
principle). With classification parity, both commonly used measures of parity (demographic
parity and utility-maximizing equalization of false positives) resulted in a 16-17% threshold for
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Black people and 31% for White people, meaning that the treatment of White people would be
almost twice as rough.70 Whether this is acceptable should be seriously discussed.
Finally, the problem previously mentioned in the outlining of classification parity persists. 71
Sometimes, in a particular context, people may not actually be discriminated against. It may be
simply the reality of the situation. Rawls would likely argue that we may have been led to this
reality due to discrimination in other contexts of life. For instance, if we were to assume that
significantly more crimes are being committed in poorer neighborhoods, the fact that some
individuals are poor sometimes warrants no other action. Rawls would claim that we counteract
the “negative” discriminations in our societies by enforcing “positive” discriminations where it is
not possible to have equality of opportunity.
4.1.1.2 Other Concerns
Some will make the case that the difference principle is utilitarian. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls
specifies in detail how his philosophy differs from utilitarianism. An important part of the
difference principle is that it was not suggested with the intention to maximize utility; it was
suggested because it was logically derived from the original position, and still takes into account
the separateness of persons (something utilitarianism does not). G.A Cohen, an analytical
Marxist, provided an extensive critique of the same principle, although there are other
philosophers who claim that the difference between the two is not their stances on egalitarianism,
but more the way they seek to achieve it.72
It becomes evident that other people may arrive at different conclusions than Rawls – even when
considering the original position – which confirms that bias is not fully removed even with a veil
of ignorance. Some of Rawls’ conclusions, for instance, were reached while implying that
humans will always put their own needs and desires first (which, if we consider the original
position, he could not have known). Nevertheless, he is one of few to have fully expressed his
thoughts and attempted to apply deontology, to its possible extent, to a consequentialist reality.
For this reason, for a first attempt, Rawls’ principles seemed to be the best by which to develop
the distributive justice considerations of this framework. This does not ever mean that his (or
our) framework is free from flaws.
Knowing that this definition of distributive justice is not carved in stone, it is essential that John
Rawls’ ideas are treated as merely a starting point for distributive justice. His approach is
deontological, which makes for a difficult practical application, but gives an idea of what we
theoretically should consider fairness. His claims are basic, since that is only as far as one can go
without making further assumptions about the specific task and model at hand. Nevertheless,
those hypotheticals will always exist, which requires us to deal with them. Therefore, this is a
framework of considerations and not criteria (as it is immensely difficult to deal with the
hypotheticals of each specific scenario in a general framework). The models in question must be
70
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evaluated with the context of their respective applications in mind (the situation specificity of
each solution will be partly addressed in 4.3).
4.1.2.1 Considerations
So, the above analysis suggests this consideration for the framework:
CONSIDERATION: Does the model in question fulfill the defined requirements of distributive
justice?
For this consideration, three questions must be answered about the solution in question, to
address the three principles of distributive justice put forth by Rawls:
SUBCONSIDERATION 1: Does the model allow each individual equal rights and liberties?
If no, then we do not have distributive justice as defined by Rawls. If yes, proceed to 2).
SUBCONSIDERATION 2: Does the model allow each individual equal opportunity in the
context of its application?
If no, proceed to 3). If yes, 3) need not be considered and we have distributive justice as defined
by Rawls.
SUBCONSIDERATION 3: Does potential inequality favor the least advantaged of the involved
groups?
If no, then we do not have distributive justice as defined by Rawls. Otherwise, we do.
In a sense, subconsideration 3 is a type of compensatory justice. However, there are more aspects
of compensation to consider in the context of ML.
4.2 Compensatory Justice
Compensatory justice concerns itself with ensuring that subjects are properly compensated for
unfair disadvantages. Let us assume that we achieve distributive justice as described above.
Now, further assume that one is part of the subset that the ML model still works against. As
previously mentioned, due to the problem of induction, ML will never yield perfect results.
Regardless of how well a model is implemented, there will always exist individuals who get
unfairly excluded from the applicability of the model in question. In other words, although a ML
model may avoid discriminating against groups, it may still discriminate against certain
individuals who are considered anomalies, or outliers. It is of utmost importance that these
outliers are not punished for the shortcomings of the model, and that the entities who choose to
deploy these models compensate accordingly.
In ML, this is a prevalent problem. In her book Automating Inequality (2018), Virginia Eubanks
explores scenarios in which the application of automation had undesirable effects. One of the
cases in question had a program make decisions on welfare distribution to individuals in Indiana,
which resulted in terrible outcomes for many individuals. One million citizens had benefits
denied during the first three years of implementation, 54% more denials than the three years
prior to implementation. One specific case that gained attention was that of Omega Young, who
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in late 2008 had her benefits revoked for not having booked an appointment, due to her being in
the hospital getting treated for cancer. The automated system interpreted this as a “failure to
cooperate.” Young died less than a year later due to her disease complications.73 In this case, the
system generalized its decision-making, based on the assumption that most people who fail to
book an appointment do not have a good enough reason to do so. Omega Young was an
unperceived outlier who had done nothing wrong.
The concept of compensatory justice ensures that there are ways to accommodate situations like
that of Omega Young. It ensures that in the case of classification anomalies, the individuals in
question do not get unjustly punished. So, in ML, compensatory justice would be established
when, even though we may have theoretical discrimination against individuals by the model,
there are failsafe ways of ensuring that this is redressed, and the practical outcome is equitable.
In Young’s case, compensatory justice could be ensuring that high-risk decisions are doublechecked by a human worker, or that outlier detection is used to have certain decisions never be
made by a ML model to begin with.
4.2.1.1 Considerations
Thus, the next consideration:
CONSIDERATION: Does the model in question fulfill the defined requirements of compensatory
justice?
For this consideration, only one question must be answered:
SUBCONSIDERATION: In the case of theoretical discrimination against individuals by the
model, does the developer have failsafe ways of ensuring that the practical outcome is equitable?
If the answer is yes, we have compensatory justice. Otherwise, we do not.
4.3 Moral Evaluation
Theoretically, we have now established the definitions and considerations of distributive and
compensatory justice respectively. It is obvious, however, that determining whether these are
carried out in practice is a more difficult task due to our differing moral views and limitations in
distancing ourselves from our biases. As 18th century philosopher and economist Adam Smith
wrote in his Theory of Moral Sentiments:
There are some situations which bear so hard upon human nature that the greatest degree
of self-government, which can belong to so imperfect a creature as man, is not able to
stifle, altogether, the voice of human weakness, or reduce the violence of the passions to
that pitch of moderation, in which the impartial spectator can entirely enter into them.74
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With certainty, we can say that ML falls into this category of situation. So, how do we make
these decisions? How do we deal with biases in ML, knowing that they will be present in some
shape or form regardless of how hard we try to eliminate them? How do we optimize the
mitigation of these biases, considering the diversity of views that must be considered? These are
the questions moral evaluation theories try to answer, both for individuals and collectives.
Smith’s impartial spectator theory is one worth considering.
4.3.1 Adam Smith’s Impartial Spectator
Smith strongly believed that our implicit biases cloud our judgment in specific situations. He
believed that these biases ignite feelings in us, which inevitably lead us to act with emotion and
not logic. He did, however, have some thoughts on how certain mindsets could partially remedy
the influence of bias. In the previously outlined quote, Smith mentioned an “impartial spectator”,
which he claims is the mindset by which individuals can distance themselves from their biases
most efficiently. The impartial spectator is a mindset in the form of a theoretical person, who can
assess the situation by considering the perspectives of everyone involved. He believed that by
distancing oneself from one’s individual feelings about a certain situation, one could reach more
sound conclusions on reasonable courses of action.
As mentioned, the impartial spectator is theoretical and has abilities beyond what humans are
capable of. This was highlighted in the previously outlined quotation. Smith continues, however,
by stating that one may make a serious attempt to emulate the abilities of the impartial spectator
by optimizing in the presence of human limitations:
Though in those cases, therefore, the behaviour of the sufferer fall short of the most
perfect propriety, it may still deserve some applause, and even in a certain sense, may be
denominated virtuous. It may still manifest an effort of generosity and magnanimity of
which the greater part of men are incapable; and though it fails of absolute perfection, it
may be a much nearer approximation towards perfection, than what, upon such trying
occasions, is commonly either to be found or to be expected.75

Adam Smith discussed, in short, how to at least attempt to optimize conditions by trying to take
the perspectives of all into consideration. Smith claims that regardless of whether we are
considering real-world or hypothetical conditions, the “presence of the impartial spectator, the
authority of the man within the breast, is always at hand to overawe them into the proper tone
and temper of moderation.”76
The strength of Smith’s impartial spectator model is that it is not merely theoretical. Research
has been done on how to enforce it empirically, especially in professional settings.77 There is,
however, only an extent to which his theories can be carried out in practice. Nevertheless,
Smith’s views emphasize how we can consciously admit our biases and do everything in our
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power to mitigate them by means of moral evaluation beyond ourselves. For this reason, we must
try to emulate the impartial spectator in our process of assessing the sufficiency of ML models.
Based on his writings on the limitations of human beings, it is also reasonable to believe that
Smith would agree that an actual impartial spectator of a specific scenario would be more
proficient in assessing its fairness, as opposed to subjects who themselves are directly involved.
This warrants the discussion of algorithmic auditing.
4.3.2 Algorithmic Auditing
Algorithmic auditing is the process by which an algorithm and its respective impact are assessed.
There is no unequivocal template to consider in completing this audit, although Smith’s impartial
spectator implies that analyzing the direct impact on the people involved should be the main
priority in assessing our models. After all, his entire moral evaluation argument regards our lack
of empathy, and that actions should be taken to improve our abilities in that respect.
Cathy O’Neil (the author of Weapons of Math Destruction) has started her own company,
ORCAA (O’Neil Risk Consulting & Algorithmic Auditing), which primarily focuses on “the
people who will be impacted by the algorithm’s success or failure”, and makes an assessment of
the risks associated with the impact on those groups.78 One of the tools ORCAA uses in auditing
algorithms and assessing their respective impacts is an ethical matrix.79 This assessment
apparatus is used, oftentimes in collaboration with affected groups, to render reasonable
conclusions on what is considered fair in the specific context. The “respect for justice” principles
of the ethical matrix are also developed specifically with John Rawls’ fairness definitions in
mind, which makes this approach a suitable fit for our purposes.80
It is necessary that the auditors be some of the very best computer scientists and programmers in
the field. The difficulties of assessing the weaknesses of a previously unencountered complex
algorithm will become evident otherwise, as these are developed by some of the most proficient
programmers in the world. It is important that when full transparency is offered by the audited
entity, that the auditor itself fully understands the process and implications.
We do not directly endorse ORCAA’s approach to algorithmic auditing, as there may be other
approaches that better emulate the impartial spectator theory (however, we have not found one).
We are also not including any directly defined considerations in the framework for moral
evaluation, as this mentality should be encouraged throughout the process and not in a specific
portion of the framework. We realize the necessity of algorithmic auditing in future practices of
ML implementation, and hope that it becomes common practice for all entities soon.
4.4 Freedom of Choice
There are situations in which distributive and compensatory justice are not necessarily accounted
for by ML, yet one may still consider it to be the best solution to the problem available. If a
cancer patient is told that there is an ML assessment tool that discriminates in performance
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against minorities, but that still performs much better than any physician’s diagnosis, one may
still want to consider it. It becomes a question of whether one would want to forego the
importance of distributive and compensatory justice for the sake of contextual performance. This
would not be an easy decision to make, as one may trust one’s own physician more than any
statistical advantage a ML model can provide, but that is the point – the decision should not be
made for the subject, but by the subject. Thus, we must consider the impact freedom of choice
has in different scenarios of ML implementation.
There are mainly two questions of freedom of choice that must be answered for us to get the full
scope:
(1) “Can the task in question be avoided altogether?” and
(2) “Are there other non-ML alternatives to completing the task in question?”
4.4.1 and 4.4.2 respectively will address these questions, as well as the reasons for which they
must be answered.
4.4.1 Choice of Task Avoidance
Throughout this work, the emphasis has been people and the severity of impact on their lives as a
result of how some tasks are pursued. Eventually, this framework is developed for the betterment
of human wellbeing. For this reason, the framework needs to ensure that the context of a
situation is accounted for and that increased caution is advised for certain situations.
Then, one may ask which circumstances warrant additional caution and restriction. One way to
approach this question is to define tasks that must be addressed for the survival of the individual
in question and can therefore not be avoided. Here, Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs can
help us define when we should be increasingly conscientious about our ML applications.
Maslow, a prominent 20th century psychologist attempted in his Theory of Human Motivation
(1943) to define our needs by their necessity. He did so to emphasize the source of motivation in
human beings, but his hierarchy is applicable in many contexts. 81 In the context of ML, we must
ensure that more good is done than harm, and that in the event of failure we ensure that negative
consequences are not beyond what we would consider reasonable. Below is a visual of Maslow’s
Hierarchy of Needs:
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Figure 4: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. 82

The case we make in using the hierarchy for our ML framework, is that tasks included in the first
two steps of Maslow’s hierarchy are tasks one does not have the choice to escape. One’s survival
is dependent on physiological needs, which in turn are dependent on the mentioned safety needs.
Long-term, without attending to our physiological and safety needs, we die. Thus, we must
ensure that decisions made by ML models about these needs are taken very seriously. For the
remainder of this work, we will refer to those two first steps of the hierarchy as “life-defining
needs”.
We do have our respective objections to Maslow’s hierarchy. For one, sex cannot reasonably be
considered a physiological need in the way food and sleep are. Simply put, one will not die
without sex. In addition, sexual intimacy is already accounted for in the love/belonging stage.
Second, for the purpose of ML application, mental health should be included in the safety stage.
Maslow would reasonably justify the exclusion of mental health as the entire pyramid intends to
address that aspect of human beings. Nevertheless, for the purpose of our framework, it is of
essence that mental health is considered and should likely be placed in the safety need step of the
hierarchy.
4.4.1.1 Considerations
The first consideration of our framework flowchart (as this will be considered before the
considerations on distributive and compensatory justice) then becomes the following:
CONSIDERATION: Is this model making decisions on life-defining needs?
4.4.2 Choice of Non-ML Alternatives
Now that we have properly defined what constitutes a task for which the choice exists to avoid it
altogether, we must consider scenarios in which the task itself is not as vital. This question is
McLeod, Saul. “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs in pyramid form with explanations and examples.” Simply
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important to consider, as it helps us define appropriate expectations on distributive and
compensatory justice for different scenarios, but also the understanding the public should have of
an algorithm. Now, the central question becomes whether there is a choice in completing the task
by other means than ML. The reason we explicitly ask for the existence of non-ML alternatives,
is due to the assumption that unless a solution is of ML nature it will, at the very least, be
interpretable.83 That is, the rationale by which the decision was made will be understandable and
that if it is not, there will be full accountability for the mistakes made. For instance, in the case of
a physician’s recommendation, we always expect a reason as to why they have arrived at a
specific recommendation. In ML, we will not always have a fully outlined rationale. So, these
are the three scenarios to consider:
4.4.2.1 Life-Defining Need Without Non-ML Alternatives
This is the scenario in which we must be most cautious about interpretability and justice
requirements. If the task regards a life-defining need, there is no escaping its completion.
Furthermore, if one does not have non-ML alternatives to consult, then the task must be
completed exactly as outlined by the model considered by the framework, or some other ML
model that the framework has deemed inferior. For this reason, it is required that our model
fulfills the recommendations of compensatory and distributive justice, but also that there is
interpretability.
4.4.2.2 Life-Defining Need With Non-ML Alternatives
Here, the recommendations on distributive and compensatory justice are not required, nor is the
recommendation of interpretability. All remain preferences, but if there are other ways of
completing the life-defining task, then the ML implementation does have flexibility in abiding by
distributive and compensatory justice, as the potential user has the freedom to avoid the
implementation or compare the implementation’s results with those arrived at through non-ML
methods.
4.4.2.3 Not a Life-Defining Need
This scenario has the same consequences as 2. First, a distinction need not be made between a
non-life-defining task with or without alternatives, as the freedom for the individual exists to
avoid the task altogether. Second, it is possible that a difference should be established between
the restrictions on life-defining tasks with alternatives and non-life-defining tasks with or without
alternatives. The rationale here is that in all three cases, the potential user is making a choice to
prioritize performance over justice. There are instances in life-defining needs where we are
aware that our solution is far from perfect, but that it is the best approach currently available. The
point is that the choice being made, although of varying importance, is of the same nature.
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4.4.2.4 Considerations
So, to address all three scenarios, the next consideration is as follows:
CONSIDERATION: Are there non-ML alternatives for accomplishing the task in question?
4.4.3 Explainable and Interpretable ML
The requirement of freedom of choice is insufficient, if we do not understand the choices at our
disposal. This is based on the idea that freedom of choice is not fully free unless the choice has
the opportunity to be fully informed and reasoned (that is, that all decision-making information is
at one’s disposal).84 Thus, we must discuss black-box models, and contrast them with
interpretable ones. Black-box models are oftentimes criticized for their inability to provide a
rationale as to how they arrive at a certain conclusion. This is why the general framework will
advise against implementation of black-box models when the user intends to complete a lifedefining task and has no other non-ML alternatives.
There are, however, exceptions to the restricted use of black-box models in safety and
physiological needs – if the subject in question has a choice in whether they are exposed to it.
Once again, assume that a subject has cancer and is looking for the optimal treatment. They will
get recommendations from a certified physician (who can explain the rationale behind their
recommendation) and a black-box ML model. Based on previous data, the ML model gives
recommendations that lead to remission 30% more often than those of the physician. It is likely
that some would be willing to place more trust in a model that seems to do better than the
average physician (even in the absence of rationale), while some may find the physician’s
rationale to be very reasonable and place trust in the explanation instead. This warrants a
comparison between interpretability and explainability.
In ML, both interpretability and explainability are about making sense of how and why a certain
model arrives at certain conclusions. Interpretability refers to when an algorithm is intuitive and
understandable without full expertise on the topic (this usually refers to a certain subset of
methods, such as Naïve Bayes classifiers and rule-based ML). Explainability is, as the word
implies, when there are ways to make sense of and simplify complex and non-intuitive
algorithms (among these are neural networks).85 Worth noting is that the type of algorithm is not
always what defines the interpretability or explainability of a model – sometimes it is the number
of features in the considered dataset. With explainable ML86, computer scientists oftentimes must
write programs to help explain the model (due to the complexity of the data and algorithm),
whereas with interpretable ML the structure and rationale of the model makes the classification
process more transparent and directly understandable.
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ML scientist Cynthia Rudin brings up an array of issues with explainable ML.87 Commonly, the
case is made that explainable ML is deployed because of its superior performance. This may be
true occasionally, which is why black-box algorithms are still warranted from time to time – but
not always. Rudin claims from experience that in most contexts, there are interpretable ML
implementations that would have equal or better accuracy compared to their explainable
counterparts.
Furthermore, the fact that programs are needed to make sense of black-box algorithms implies
that even the explanations provided for the model in question are not doing the full model
justice. If the original model were fully explainable, we would not need a program to explain it
for us. As Rudin herself puts it:
An explainable model that has a 90% agreement with the original model indeed explains
the original model most of the time. However, an explanation model that is correct 90%
of the time is wrong 10% of the time. If a tenth of the explanations are incorrect, one
cannot trust the explanations, and thus one cannot trust the original black box. If we
cannot know for certain whether our explanation is correct, we cannot know whether to
trust either the explanation or the original model.88

Explainable ML also has weaknesses in not being able to properly accommodate the specific
circumstances of each subject, as well as increasing the probability of human error due to the
extensive preprocessing needed to ensure that all data is correct. Preprocessing data for
interpretable models with fewer features is doable – doing the same for a program like COMPAS
with more than 130 features is difficult in comparison.
Rudin advocates for more interpretable ML models instead of explainable ones, as they make us
able to more efficiently analyze its flaws. They are sometimes more difficult to construct
algorithmically but allow subjects who are not necessarily experts on the topic of ML to
intuitively understand how they are being assessed.89
Occam’s Razor, a principle used extensively and that has empirically been proven very useful in
analysis, becomes relevant here. The principle has multiple different formulations, but the main
one attributed to theologian William of Ockham is: “Plurality must never be posited without
necessity.”90 The gist of the statement is that if one has competing solutions to a problem, then
the simplest (most understandable) solution is preferred. The case is made that excessive
complexity leads to more potentially unfounded assumptions, which in turn reduce the credibility
of one’s solution. For this reason, it would never make sense to choose a black-box model when
other interpretable models have similar performance. Furthermore, it would also be unwise to
consult explainable ML if interpretable ML has not been attempted. This is why the framework
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advises that if the task in question never has been completed using ML, that the first attempt
should be with an interpretable model.
4.4.3.1 Considerations
Thus, the following considerations:
CONSIDERATION: Is this a black-box model?
CONSIDERATION: Is this the first time the task is being completed with ML?
CONSIDERATION: Do interpretable models with similar performance exist?
Due to the importance of having interpretability, this framework recommends that if a certain
task never has been pursued previously, that the first attempt is made with an interpretable model
before consulting other, potentially black-box solutions.
Assuming that explainable models only are implemented when performing better than
interpretable ones, when we are faced with a choice between an interpretable model (ML or nonML) and an explainable model, it is essentially a choice between interpretability and
performance. But, in the case of black-box models, you really do not know for certain what the
choice is. Since black-box models cannot be fully rationalized and interpreted, there is no way to
justify them being the sole option under any circumstance in which avoiding the task altogether
is not a choice (that is, if it addresses a life-defining need). Thus, the framework does not allow
black-box models for use in life-defining tasks with no other alternatives. In these cases, there is
not a choice to be made between interpretability and performance, and in those situations (as
elaborated on previously), we prioritize interpretability. Although our societies and judicial
systems oftentimes are consequentialist, we still place importance on how consequences come
about. Otherwise, our courts would consider manslaughter and murder to be the same thing since
the outcomes are nearly identical – but they do not. Clearly, the rationale by which a decision is
made is significant, which the prioritization of interpretability emphasizes in this context.
Do note that this framework does not ensure that should one opt for a non-ML solution, one will
avoid the injustices that come with the model in question. It just ensures that ML is not
responsible for the injustices, and that if it is, that one has chosen to subject oneself to them. This
does not, however, mean that the responsibility lies entirely on the user. There should also exist
accountability for entities to provide the right information and having the right intentions.
4.5 Accountability
In our current societies, there are many incentives for entities to deploy ML for various tasks. It
saves money because, unlike humans, it does not require financial compensation. It saves time
because it can make inferences from immense amounts of data in a fraction of the time required
for a human being.
Most importantly for entities, however, ML saves accountability (although this applies to
automation and AI holistically). Due to ML being applied to new and unexplored contexts
constantly, there are few to no ways of deciding legally who is responsible for failures in
distributive and compensatory justice. This has become a large discussion topic in the context of
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self-driving car accidents and accompanying liabilities.91 But, as the Voltaire-inspired Peter
Parker principle famously states: “With great power comes great responsibility.” 92 This rationale
has been used by ethicists to justify the accountability being placed on developers of the
decision-making algorithms. Kirsten Martin, business ethics professor at George Washington
University, says:
As such, firms should be responsible not only for the value-laden-ness of an algorithm
but also for designing who-does-what within the algorithmic decision. As such, firms
developing algorithms are accountable for designing how large a role individual will be
permitted to take in the subsequent algorithmic decision. Counter to current arguments, I
find that if an algorithm is designed to preclude individuals from taking responsibility
within a decision, then the designer of the algorithm should be held accountable for the
ethical implications of the algorithm in use.93

Responsibility for failure in these models should be put on a defined set of individuals prior to
launch. There should never be ambiguity in whom to consult (or blame) in situations of injustice,
and the incentives for entities and individuals should not exist to avoid accountability through
ML (especially if they are already benefitting from savings of money and time).
4.5.1.1 Considerations
Thus, the following consideration:
CONSIDERATION: Are the individuals behind the model’s development claiming full
responsibility for failure in fulfilling the requirements of distributive and compensatory justice?
If the answer is yes, the model could be allowed implementation in some form. If there are flaws
in distributive and compensatory justice prior to launch, these should be publicly disclosed for
freedom of choice to be a reality. If the answer is no, the model should not be allowed
implementation without exception.
Worth noting is that accountability only applies to the impactors and impacted of the model in
question. Thus, if a supposedly unjust ML model is to be implemented on a smaller scale, if
consensus can be found among all exposed individuals, the model should still be allowed
implementation due to it being within the freedom of choice of aforementioned individuals to
subject themselves to the model. This is helpful, as there may exist businesses and individuals
who can benefit from the use of ML on a small scale, but do not have the resources to create
robust and generally equitable models.
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4.6 Pre-Implementation Flowchart
And thus, we arrive at the below flowchart representation for considerations prior to
implementation:

Figure 5: Flowchart representation of the implementation framework.

4.7 Post-Implementation Accountability
The above flowchart only accounts for considerations before implementing a certain ML model.
Nevertheless, there are considerations for situations that may occur after implementation as well.
After all, many of the issues that arise in ML result from use of the respective models in applied
contexts. Thus far, the framework has encouraged increased general conscientiousness and
accountability in developing and deploying ML, with additional caution being advised in
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situations of life-defining needs (to avoid catastrophic situations like that of Omega Young).94
Finally, before concluding our analysis of the issue at hand, we must ensure the same exactitude
and accountability as the models are applied in the real world.
The requirements of transparency, distributive and compensatory justice are truly difficult to
satisfy for most ML models. They must be. There is a reason only a select few models warrant
implementation for life-defining needs when no other non-ML alternatives are available.
Therefore, this cannot be understated: good ML models are works in progress and must be
treated as such. This is where restorative justice plays a role.
4.7.1 Restorative Justice
To echo Adam Smith’s thoughts regarding virtue, accountability does not imply achieved
perfection.95 This framework openly allows implementation even in cases where distributive
and/or compensatory justice requirements are not met. Accountability implies the ambition of
perfection. It implies that if justice requirements are not met, that the producer of the model
intends to improve the algorithm, with intentions to make it more just with time. Restorative
justice can aid us in doing that efficiently.
Restorative justice concerns itself with holding responsible subjects accountable for wrongdoings
by having them fix their problems through cooperation with and understanding of victims. It is
the idea that offenders should be allowed the opportunity to right their wrongs without additional
criminal punishment. Howard Zehr, a pioneer in the field of restorative justice, outlines the
concept and its rationale using these three principles:
-

Crime is a violation of people and of interpersonal relationships.
Violations create obligations.
The central obligation is to put right the wrongs.96

Admittedly, restorative justice was developed as a new way to deal with crime. Many of the
wrongs made in good faith and by mistake in ML will not be considered crimes by our legal
systems (and our framework), and so “crime” may not be the right word to use in this context.
Replacing “crime” with “injustice” in the context of ML will make these principles strongly
applicable to what we want to achieve. In the case of failure in fulfilling the outlined
requirements of distributive and/or compensatory justice, it is important that there exists an
expectation for the entity responsible to improve the model. We do not want to punish entities
for honest mistakes – instead, we want to encourage a deeper understanding of the users’
problems, so that they can efficiently be dealt with.
It is here that we argue that competition provided by free markets in liberal societies will, to a
certain extent, automatically encourage companies to improve their models if the flaws are
publicly disclosed – even if that were not the initial intention.97 If people affected know the flaws
of a certain application, they will move toward other solutions that do not discriminate, should
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they appear. Having the flaws publicly exposed will make the lack of discrimination a truly
marketable trait of a model. Free markets – to the extent that they are reasonable – are also
especially important, to increase the likelihood of full accommodation of fairness.98 If there are
more options to consider, the likelihood that an individual will align with the fairness definition
of at least one of them is larger than if options are fewer. In that regard, when there are no “right”
answers, markets can aid us in providing more solutions (of different nature) to the same
problem, making more people content in the process.99
4.7.2 Criminal Justice
We mentioned previously that there are incentives for entities to pursue ML solutions other than
proficiency in solving a problem. For that reason, if a model saves an entity time and money the
way it already is, there would not be much incentive to fully disclose the issues with it, as well as
dealing with the concerns of users. If there is no intention to improve the deficient model, it
shows that the company did not make the model with the improvement of the human condition in
mind, but for the other incentives provided by the market. This is where we get to the issues of
entities and individuals failing to hold themselves accountable and required criminal justice as a
result.
Due to the inductive nature of ML and the inherent biases of human beings, there should be room
for trial and error in developing what we consider a just application. Nevertheless, these trials
should be done in good faith. There should be a distinction between the treatment of those who
mistakenly implemented inadequate applications, and those who did so knowingly. With
accountability comes the intention to work towards better – not cheaper and more time efficient
– solutions.
4.7.2.1 Considerations
Thus, the following consideration:
CONSIDERATION: In the case of failure in fulfilling the requirements of distributive and
compensatory justice, was there negligence or reluctance to deal with obvious problems?
If no, then restorative justice measures should be taken. If yes, then criminal justice measures
should be taken.
One may have differing views on what “obvious” problems are. We argue that the definition
should regard the problems brought to light during algorithmic auditing. For instance, assuming
one uses ORCAA’s approach, obvious problems can be defined as those brought up in the
development of the ethical matrix.100 Nevertheless, it would be dependent on how algorithmic
auditing is done.
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4.7.3 Additional Comments
To reiterate, restorative justice measures will have to continue until there are no evident biases in
the respective programs, which likely will be – never. Criminal justice measures are only
warranted if restorative justice has been encouraged and denied by the entity in question.
Although we have developed a framework based on deontological arguments, our current legal
frameworks are based on consequentialism. The interplay between restorative and criminal
justice accounts for the consequentialist nature of our legal statutes, while still emphasizing the
importance of a deontological approach to societal issues. It also allows for a distinction between
good and bad intentions.
We will not elaborate on the nature of and approach to criminal justice, as we believe measures
can be taken to make criminal justice a non-necessity in the future (as we will discuss briefly
later). Nevertheless, assuming the current structure of our economy, it is important that the
criminal punishment is severe enough, so that it disincentivizes the act of wrongdoing. As 2020
U.S Presidential Candidate Andrew Yang expresses on his website when discussing the lack of
accountability for pharmaceutical companies in the opioid crisis: “Purdue Pharma has made
more than $35 billion in revenue since releasing OxyContin in 1995. The fine of $635 million for
false advertising around claims of non-addictiveness and tamper-proofing is barely a slap on the
wrist.”101 If we are to take the route of criminal justice, we need to ensure that the repercussions
are not merely a “slap on the wrist” to incentivize just measures.
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5 Reflections on Work and Future Areas of Research
Conceiving a new framework from scratch has been challenging, and multiple different
approaches were taken before arriving at the one seen in this thesis. Considering that this was a
first attempt at an ethical framework for the implementation of ML, it is more than possible that
there are other thoughts and philosophical theories that could contribute to the framework, either
by replacing certain parts or adding substance to the current structure. Hopefully this serves as a
reason for other models to be developed, which take new stances on the topic in question.
The main importance was to develop considerations that had a common thread of logic, without
making the framework overwhelmingly technical. This work is intended for anyone affected by
ML, either as impactor or impacted. Today, that is essentially everyone. For this reason, it was
important to develop guidelines that are, to a large extent, understandable to most or all human
beings. We believe that this work has succeeded in this regard, and that with additional
constructive feedback, can help spur discussion about a field that needs more serious
consideration in the near future.
One weakness of the current framework is that it does not consider the hierarchy of importance
in Rawls’ three principles of distributive justice. By this framework, you either fulfill the
requirements (along with compensatory justice) or you do not. It may be the case that if the
model does not fulfill the first subconsideration, that implementation should not be advised in
any context.102 A future ambition would be to take this first attempt and after extensive feedback
elaborate on some of the gaps in collaboration with other peers. In 2017, IEEE started
developing a “Standard for Algorithmic Bias Considerations” to provide a guideline for involved
program architects and project leaders.103 We hope to see more analysis of the IEEE Standard,
along with other frameworks (including ours), to assess their strengths and weaknesses in
addressing bias in ML.
We recognize that the current framework needs legal backing of some nature to serve a
substantive purpose. Entities will rarely abide by an ethical framework if the economy
incentivizes other action. This has only recently become recognized in law, with the European
Union establishing action against algorithmic bias in its 2018 General Data Production
Regulation (GDPR).104 The U.S has now also understood the necessity for legal action, with a
bill – the Algorithmic Accountability Act – being introduced to the House of Representatives in
2019. 105 106 These measures are indeed important, but it will be of essence to ensure that the
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regulations in question are carried out efficiently and with realistic expectations, which will take
trial and error.
In this regard, one area that needs serious research and consideration is incentive structures
within our respective economies that would make the implementation of the above outlined
framework practically possible. First, it may be the case that even if there are compensatory
justice requirements to consider, that the criminal justice measures are too mild for companies to
want to avoid them. In other words, there exist scenarios in which companies would skip the
considerations of compensatory and distributive justice for the purpose of profitability. The
reason we chose not to elaborate on the specifics of criminal justice is because we believe that in
the right economy, we barely need criminal justice. In a human-centered economy, where there
are incentives to justly and ethically implement technology for the benefit of all, we believe
negligence and reluctance would be non-factors in the greater scheme of things, and that
restorative justice would take precedence. Currently, our economy has financial incentives. A
prime example in the context of ML is data collection. Gathering datasets specifically made for
the context in question is much more expensive than to train the model with already existing,
more general datasets. Due to the financial incentives of companies, and the fact that they are the
ones investing in such a service, they will see little reason to invest additionally to make up for
what they consider small deficiencies in their programs. This would be different in an economy
that prioritizes the wellbeing of its people. The idea of human-centered capitalism has been
popularized by individuals like 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus and 2020 U.S
Presidential Candidate Andrew Yang.107 We realize that this suggested research may arrive at
non-capitalist recommendations, which would require changes in our framework as it currently
relies on our contemporary incentive structures. Nevertheless, more research on how to
practically implement a human-centered economy will alleviate some of the issues not only in
ML, but in other contexts of our societal reality. That could only be a good thing.
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6 Conclusion
In a world of booming technology, it is imperative that actions are taken to ensure that our
advancements are not used for purposes other than the improvement of the human condition. In
that regard, computer scientists have taken measures to try to accommodate the importance of
justice and fairness in our ML applications. Our analysis confirms that both concepts are not
always simple to integrate into our mathematical models, which should encourage us to be
increasingly conscientious about how and when we implement ML and discourage us from using
ML in every technically applicable context. In this endeavor, we completed a first effort to
develop a framework that accommodates for present limitations in both human beings and
technology and sets what we believe are realistic expectations for developers and entities to
follow.
The practical measures to be taken for this theoretical framework to properly work are many, and
the framework is limited in its ability. Nevertheless, our developed implementation
considerations provide a foundation to build on and start the conversation on a topic worthy of
further discussion and elaboration. The potential gaps of the thesis do not detract from the fact
that we need a framework with which to assess the implementation of machine learning, and that
just as in the field it intends to target, it will require trial and error to optimize. This should only
serve as the beginning of a field in desperate need of growth. We hope to witness this
progression in the coming months and years.
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